

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-09 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 MBFR-03

SAJ-01 DODE-00 TRSE-00 CU-04 IO-12 OIC-04 ACDA-19

OMB-01 EB-11 SCI-06 EPA-04 CEQ-02 SCA-01 RSR-01 SS-14

NSC-10 /168 W

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9512

INFO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 1527

E. O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE: PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECOND STAGE

HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

REF: USNATO 1007

SUMMARY. REPORT THAT SOVIETS ARE WORKING ON TEXTS FOR ADOPTION BY SECOND STAGE OF CSCE (HELSINKI 770) AND FACT THAT EC NINE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING THIS SUBJECT MEANS THAT TIME IS RIPE TO INITIATE SIMILAR EFFORT HERE. WE SEE NATO STUDY AS ENCOURAGING ALLIES TO FOCUS ON TYPES OF AGREEMENT THEY SHOULD SEEK AS INTERMEDIATE STEP BEFORE ACTUAL WORK ON TEXTS. IF WASHINGTON HAS STRONG PREFERENCE FOR SPECIFIC TYPE (OR TYPES) OF AGREEMENTS UNDER EACH AGENDA ITEM, THIS INTERMEDIATE STAGE COULD BE DROPPED. ACTION REQUESTED: AUTHORIZATION TO TABLE TEXT BELOW IN SPC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.

1. MENDELEVICH' S STATEMENT (HELSINKI 700) THAT SOVIETS WERE IN PROCESS OF DRAFTING TEXTS FOR CSCE SECOND STAGE COMBINED WITH FACT THAT EC NINE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON THIS SUBJECT INDICATES CONFIDENTIAL

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TO US THAT TIME HAS COME TO INITIATE SIMILAR PROCESS IN NATO. OTHERWISE, WE FEAR THAT EC NINE WILL CONTINUE WITH THEIR WORK TO

POINT WHERE RELATIVELY FIRM AGREEMENT REACHED ON TEXTS BEFORE CONSULTING IN NATO ON THIS SUBJECT. IF WE ARE ABLE, HOWEVER, TO INITIATE WORK IN NATO BEHAD EXPLAINED THAT THEY CONTINE TO ATTACH PRIME IMPORTANCE TO MANILA PACT, THAT THEY THOUGHT SEATO' S EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON ASSISTANCE WITH COUNTER- INSURGENCY, AND THAT THEY FELT THERE COULD BE CONSIDERABLE CUTBACK IN FIELD OF MILITARY EXERCISES AND PLANNING ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT PJAPOSE TO DISTURB PLANS ALREADY ON THE SHELF. THEY ALSO FELT SEATO IS NOT SUITABLE VEHICLE FOR EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD BE BETTER CONDUCTED BILATERALLY. THEY FOUND CHARTCHAI QUITE RECEPTIVE ABOUT CUTBACKS ON MILITARY ACTIVITES AND ALSO READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE IMPORTANCE OF COUNTER- INSURGENCY AS OPPOSED TO INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT PLANNING FOR CONVENTIONAL CONTINGENCIES.

4. INTERESTINGLY I GAINED DEFINITED IMPRESSION THAT NEW ZEALAND IS CONTEMPLATING SEEKING ASEAN MEMBERSHIP EVENTUALLY. FAULKNER HOWEVER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIIIS IS ENTIRELY PREMATURE AND THAT THE ASEAN MEMBERS ARE NOT PRESENTLY LOOKING FOR ADDITIONS OUTSIDE SOUTHEAST ASIA AND STILL EVEN HAVING THEIR PROBLEMS AMONG THEMSELVES. IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT ONLY THE THAIS MIGHT BE READY TO ADD NEW ZEALAND (AND AUSTRALIA?) TO ASEAN.

5. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION NEW ZEALANDERS ALSO TOLD ME THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF MOVING RAPIDLY ON ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH HANOI. FOR ONE THING THEY REFERRED TO MALAYSIA' S IMMINENT ACTION AND THE AVAILABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE FROM THAT SOURCE ONCE REPRESENTATIVES ARE EXCHANGED, AND THEY ALSO FELT POLITICALLY IT WAS WISER FOR NEW ZEALAND TO GO SLOW ON THIS. WITH REGARD TO CAMBODIA THEIR THINKING SEEMED TO BE TENDING TOWARD THE CONCLUSION THAT SOONER OR LATER ONE WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO SIHANOUK TO RESOLVE THE INTERNAL PROBLEM. THEY ALSO APPEARED TO FEEL THAT THE MILITANT BUDDHIST FACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL EVENTUALLY COME OUT ON TOP IN ANY POLITICAL CONTEST.

6. IT WAS INTERESTING ALSO THAT WHEN FAULKNER REPLIED TO HIS HOST' S TOAST HE FIRST REFERRED TO ANZUS AND MADE CLEAR THAT WAS THE KEY-CONFIDENTIAL

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STONE OF NEW ZEALAND' S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY. HE NOTED THAT ANZUS HAD AND REQUIRED NO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THEN REFERRED TO SEATO, TO WHIC HE ALSO GAVE SUPPORT, WITH IMPLICATION THAT ORGANIZATION WAS PERHAPS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING THERE EITHER. FINALLY HE PAID TRIBUTE TO ASEAN STATING RATHER OPENLY NEW ZEALAND' S CLOSE INTEREST IN THE ORGANIZATION EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT " AT PRESENT" SEEK MEMBERSHIP.

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